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Many jurisdictions in high-income countries maintain separate
legal structures for the provision of mental healthcare based on
risk on the one hand and incapacity on the other. England and
Wales is now one of these jurisdictions and has the Mental Health
Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Both have been
amended by the Mental Health Act 2007. Jurisdictions that
maintain these separate frameworks need to manage the interface
between them. In cases where detention in hospital is required this
can cause legal difficulties, particularly for jurisdictions covered by
the European Convention on Human Rights. This study addresses
some of the dilemmas that can arise in the setting of admission to
psychiatric hospital from the community.
The Mental Health Act establishes a framework for the
provision of treatment, on an involuntary basis if necessary, to
those suffering from mental disorder to the specified degree.
The main criteria for its application are the presence of mental
disorder and risk to the individual themselves or others
(Appendix 1).
The Mental Capacity Act, on the other hand, provides a more
general framework through which decisions, including those
relating to medical treatment, may be taken on behalf of adults
who lack decision-making capacity. The absence of capacity is
the main criterion for its application. The Mental Health Act is
primarily concerned with the reduction of risk both to the
individual and to others, while the Mental Capacity Act is
designed to enable the individual to make their own decisions
as far as possible, to ensure that decisions reflect the individual’s
best interests and that the least restrictive intervention is used.
The Mental Health Act provides for the legal detention of people
in hospital for treatment, but prior to the enactment of the Mental
Capacity Act non-objecting individuals who lacked capacity were
often accommodated in hospital informally, outside the Mental
Health Act, using common law powers.1 This practice was held
to breach the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on
Human Rights in cases where the restrictions imposed on the
individual amounted to a deprivation of liberty.2 In 2007 the
Mental Capacity Act was amended to include the safeguards
necessary to comply with the requirements of the European
Convention on Human Rights in cases where a deprivation of
liberty is required in the person’s own best interests. Thus either
statute could apply to adults with mental disorders who lack
capacity and require treatment for those disorders, even when that
treatment includes the deprivation of liberty. At the point of
Mental Health Act assessment, clinicians will have the dilemma
of which of the two frameworks to use.3 First, individuals lacking
capacity can no longer be treated informally under the common
law, the principles of the Mental Capacity Act must be applied
if the Mental Health Act is not used. Second, if this treatment
involves deprivation of liberty, then a choice must be made
between detention under the Mental Health Act and the
application of the deprivation of liberty safeguards under the
amended Mental Capacity Act.4 The factors governing this choice
include the presence of objections on the part of the individual.3,4
A different dilemma concerns people who are detained under
the Mental Health Act with capacity. Although this practice is
lawful,3 there have been concerns expressed about the ethics and
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Background
In England and Wales mental health services need to take
account of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental
Health Act 1983. The overlap between these two causes
dilemmas for clinicians.
Aims
To describe the frequency and characteristics of patients
who fall into two potentially anomalous groups: those who
are not detained but lack mental capacity; and those who
are detained but have mental capacity.
Method
Cross-sectional study of 200 patients admitted to psychiatric
wards. We assessed mental capacity using a semi-structured
interview, the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for
Treatment (MacCAT–T).
Results
Of the in-patient sample, 24% were informal but lacked
capacity: these patients felt more coerced and had greater
levels of treatment refusal than informal participants with
capacity. People detained under the Mental Health Act with
capacity comprised a small group (6%) that was hard to
characterise.
Conclusions
Our data suggest that psychiatrists in England and Wales
need to take account of the Mental Capacity Act, and in
particular best interests judgments and deprivation of liberty
safeguards, more explicitly than is perhaps currently the
case.
Declaration of interest
G.R. chaired the Expert Committee on the review of the
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the potentially stigmatising consequences of allowing mental
health law based on risk to ‘trump’ mental health law based on
capacity and individual autonomy.5–7
In this paper we aim to describe how existing psychiatric
practice mapped on to this new legal landscape, specifically:
(a) what are the characteristics of informal patients meeting the
incapacity criterion of the Mental Capacity Act? In particular,
what is the degree of ‘objecting’ to treatment and how might
this bear upon Mental Health Act detention;
(b) what are the characteristics of individuals detained under the
Mental Health Act with capacity? Does recent self-harm or
violence characterise this group;
(c) in individuals with capacity and without capacity, what
predicts detention under the Mental Health Act?
Method
Participants
We performed a cross-sectional study based in three general adult
acute psychiatric wards (one female and two male) at the
Maudsley Hospital, London, UK. These wards serve part of
Southwark, a deprived inner-London borough with an ethnically
diverse population. The local research ethics committee approved
the study.
Consecutive patients, admitted between February 2006 and
June 2007, were identified by regular examination of the electronic
medical records and consultations with the ward nursing staff. All
admissions were included other than those admitted during
planned research breaks. The sole exclusions were people from
other catchment areas admitted to the wards and those transferred
from other in-patient facilities. All individuals who spoke English
were approached for a research interview. Those who assented
were provided with full details of the study and the interview
was stopped if there was any subsequent change in choice or
resistance. Written consent was sought and participants were
offered £5 for their time. Interviews were conducted as close to
the admission as possible.
Assessment of capacity
Relevant information about the participant’s presenting problems,
diagnosis and treatment plan was obtained from the medical
record and discussion with the clinical team. The clinical
researcher (G.O.) determined whether the treating team’s
principal treatment recommendation at that time was stabilisation
on medication or admission to a place of safety (hospitalisation).
If it was medication, then the capacity assessment centred on the
decision to take the recommended medication or not. If it was
hospitalisation, then it was the capacity to decide on whether to
come into hospital or not.
The presence or absence of capacity to decide on treatment
was based on the two-stage test formulated in the Mental Capacity
Act. This requires: evidence of ‘an impairment of, or disturbance
in, the functioning of the mind or brain’ (Section 2(1)); and
evidence that this impairment or disturbance means that the
person is unable to make a specific decision (Section 3(1)). We
interpreted the first stage of the test using clinical psycho-
pathological concepts and ICD–10 diagnoses.8
The capacity judgement was facilitated by a clinical assessment
(notes review and clinical interview) and the administration of the
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment
(MacCAT–T).9 The MacCAT–T is a semi-structured interview that
provides relevant information disclosures to individuals about
their illness (including its risks), the nature of treatment options
and their risks and benefits. The assessor evaluates capacity in
terms of four abilities relating to the disclosures: understanding,
appreciation, reasoning and expressing a choice. These abilities
map onto the abilities regarded as relevant by the Mental Capacity
Act which are understanding, retaining, using, weighing and
communicating. ‘Using’ is the term the Law Commission favoured
in place of the term ‘appreciation’.10 We interpreted the terms to
have equivalent meanings.
The judgement about capacity followed the approach outlined
by Grisso & Appelbaum.11 This incorporates the ‘sliding scale’
concept whereby decisions that carry a greater risk require greater
evidence of the relevant decision-making abilities. This concept is
similar to the English Law notion that the graver the consequences
of the decision, the commensurately greater the level of
competence that is required to make it.
The content of the MacCAT–T was modified for this study.
When the principal treatment decision concerned medication,
participants were given a disclosure about ‘no medication’ as the
alternative to the ‘recommended’ medication rather than iterate
through all medication options. This was done to simplify the
interview and to reflect the main choice people who are acutely
ill typically face. When the principal treatment decision concerned
hospitalisation, participants were given a disclosure about the
option of being an in-patient or not. Each disclosure involved
giving the individual simple information about the nature of the
option and its risks and benefits. The form of the MacCAT–T
was left unaltered by these changes. Previous studies have
demonstrated excellent interrater reliability (k408) when the
MacCAT–T is used in this way.12,13
Other variables
Details of status under the Mental Health Act were obtained from
the clinical records. The Expanded Schedule for the Assessment of
Insight (SAI–E)14 and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS)15
were also administered. Both are clinically based, semi-structured
interviews. The SAI–E comprises three main dimensions
(awareness of illness, relabelling of symptoms as pathological
and treatment adherence). We used the summary of adherence
score (Item C of the SAI–E) as our measure of treatment refusal.
This is a seven-point scale: 1 = complete rejection of treatment;
2 = partial rejection; 3 = reluctant acceptance; 4 = occasional
reluctance; 5 = passive acceptance; 6 =moderate participation;
7 = active participation. We used the relabelling score because it
has conceptual similarity with ‘use’ (in the Mental Capacity
Act). This scale measures the extent to which symptoms that the
clinical interview has highlighted as indicators of illness can be
regarded as such by the patient. We separated relabelling from
treatment refusal because they are conceptually distinguishable.
We adjusted the total BPRS score to account for domains of
psychopathology that were not assessable (e.g. hallucinations in
an individual who was mute) by summing subscores and dividing
the total by the number of BPRS domains that were assessable.
This was done to obtain a measure of total symptoms that was
not misleadingly low in participants who did not respond to
questions about symptoms. Level of symptoms is sometimes used
with ‘insight’ to interpret ‘nature and degree’ (in the Mental
Health Act). Broad ICD–10 categories were used for the main
mental disorder.
We recorded acts of self-harm and violence in the period 2
weeks prior to admission until the point of assessment using
information from the medical records, nursing staff and self-
report. To structure this we used the Modified Overt Aggression
Scale.16
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We used the MacArthur Admissions Experience Survey17 to
collect information relating to subjective coercion. This relates
to recent admission and includes measures of participants’
perceived coercion, recall of negative pressures and sense of ‘voice’
in the admission procedure.
Statistical analysis
Analyses were performed using Stata 9.2 for Windows.
Conventional bivariate methods were used to compare participant
groups.
Results
Details on the 350 consecutive admissions with prevalence
estimates of mental incapacity are reported elsewhere.18 Two
hundred people were interviewed by the researcher. Individuals
interviewed were similar to individuals not interviewed on
diagnosis, number of previous admissions, length of contact with
services and global assessment of functioning. People not inter-
viewed had significantly higher levels of treatment refusal than
those interviewed with a trend to being more frequently detained
(details available from the author on request).
Decision-making capacity status and status under the Mental
Health Act divides participants into four broad groups: informal/
capacity, informal/incapacity, detained/capacity, detained/
incapacity. (Informal participants are those in respect of whom
no Mental Health Act powers have been taken.) Table 1 shows
participants according to these groups. In each group the types
of mental disorder (ICD–10) and, where applicable, the Mental
Health Act section is summarised.
Tables 2 and 3 address informal and detained participants
respectively. Explanations of the scales used are given as footnotes.
Table 2 shows the differences between informal participants with
and without capacity. In informal participants, levels of treatment
refusal and negative experience of admission were significantly
higher in the incapacity group than in the capacity group. In
the incapacity group the median value of treatment refusal was
5 (passive acceptance of treatment) with the interquartile range
between 4 and 6 (occasional reluctance to moderate partici-
pation). When treatment refusal was converted to a binary
variable using a cut-off score of less than 5 (treatment adherence
less than passive acceptance) to indicate ‘objection’ to treatment
then 18 participants without capacity (38%) objected and
incapacity associated with ‘objection’ to treatment (w2 = 20.1,
P50.001). If the cut-off score was set at less than 3 (any rejection
of treatment) then only three participants without capacity (6%)
‘objected’ although incapacity was still associated with ‘objection’
(w2 = 4.78, P50.03). Symptom levels were significantly higher and
ability to relabel symptoms as pathological were lower in the
individuals without capacity. Levels of recent self-harm and
violence showed no significant difference.
Table 3 shows the differences between detained participants
with and without capacity. In detained individuals, levels of
treatment refusal and negative experience of admission did not
differ by capacity status. Levels of symptoms were higher and
ability to relabel those symptoms as pathological was significantly
lower in the participants without capacity. Recent violence showed
no significant difference but recent self-harm was significantly
higher in those with capacity.
Tables 4 and 5 address participants with and without capacity
respectively. Table 4 shows the variables which associate with
detention in participants with capacity. The only variable which
was associated with detention in participants with capacity was
treatment refusal. Recent self-harm or violence, levels of
symptoms or inability to relabel symptoms as pathological were
not associated with detention. To obtain a clearer understanding
of this important group of individuals, we examined in detail
the case records concerning the circumstances of admission for
the 12 people with capacity who were detained. They fell into
three groups:
(a) five participants (three with a psychosis) probably lacked
capacity at the time of admission, but then made a rapid
improvement;
(b) five participants (two with a psychosis) presented with recent
behaviour indicating a risk of future self-harm (four individuals)
or of violence (one person) and it was unclear what the
individual’ intentions were;
(c) two people with a psychosis with extensive previous contact
with services engineered an involuntary admission to ensure
they were admitted, probably to gain respite from problems
in the community.
Table 5 shows the variables that were associated with detention
in individuals without capacity. Treatment refusal, recent violence
and inability to relabel symptoms as pathological were all
associated with detention. Total symptoms were not associated
with detention. Recent self-harm was associated with informal
care.
Discussion
Main findings
People admitted to psychiatric hospital from the community span
all four groups created by capacity law and the Mental Health Act:
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Table 1 Mental disorder and legal status
Capacity Incapacity
Informal, n 73 47
Mental disorder, n (%)
Psychotic episode 10 (13.7) 11 (23.4)
Schizophrenia 6 (8.2) 11 (23.4)
Schizoaffective disorder 1 (1.4) 5 (10.6)
Bipolar affective disorder, manic phase 1 (1.4) 5 (10.6)
Bipolar affective disorder, depressed
phase 5 (6.9) 1 (2.1)
Depression 29 (39.7) 11 (23.4)
Personality disorder 14 (19.2) 0
Post-traumatic stress disorder 1 (1.4) 0
Organic 0 1 (2.1)
Other 6 (8.2) 2 (4.3)
Detained, n 12 68
Mental disorder, n (%)
Psychotic episode 5 (41.7) 18 (26.5)
Schizophrenia 2 (16.7) 20 (29.4)
Schizophrenia disorder 0 4 (5.9)
Bipolar affective disorder, manic phase 0 17 (25.0)
Bipolar affective disorder, depressed
phase 0 0
Depression 2 (16.7) 4 (5.9)
Personality disorder 0 1 (1.5)
Post-traumatic stress disorder 2 (16.7) 1 (1.5)
Organic 0 3 (4.4)
Other 1 (8.3)
Mental Health Act applies, section: n (%)
S.4 0 1 (1.4)
5.2 2 (16.7) 19 (27.9)
S.2 9 (75.0) 27 (39.7)
S.3 1 (8.3) 20 (29.4)
Court order 0 1 (1.5)
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capacity/informal, incapacity/informal, capacity/detained and
incapacity/detained. The largest groups are capacity/informal
(37%) and incapacity/detained (34%). Approximately a third fell
into the legally and ethically more problematic categories of
incapacity/informal and capacity/detained. Of these, the incapacity/
informal group was large, comprising 24% of the sample. Most
people in this group have a psychotic illness or depression as
the main mental disorder, a pattern similar to that of the
detained/incapacity group. With regard to the provision of
treatment to this incapacity/informal group the principles of the
Mental Capacity Act will now apply, thus any treatment given will
have to be in the person’s best interests and be the least restrictive
alternative. However, if this treatment involves deprivation of
liberty under article 5, European Convention on Human Rights,
then a choice will have to be made between detention under the
Mental Health Act and the application of the deprivation of liberty
260
Table 2 Differences between informal participants with and without capacity
Variable
Informal capacity
(n=73)
Informal incapacity
(n=47) Test statistic P
Treatment refusala
Mean (s.d.) 6.2 (0.8) 4.7 (1.3) t=77.77 (d.f. = 118) 50.001
Range 3–7 2–7
Median (IQR) 6 (6–7) 5 (4–6)
Experience of admission, median (IQR)
Perceived coercionb 1 (0–3) 3 (1–4) Mann–Whitney z=2.7 0.007
Negative pressuresc 0 (0–1) 1 (0–3) Mann–Whitney z=4.4 50.001
Voiced 3 (2–3) 2 (0–2) Mann–Whitney z=73.4 50.001
Recent self-harm, n (%)
No self-harm 40 (54.8) 34 (72.3) w2 = 4.4 (d.f. = 2) 0.11
Minor self-injury 6 (8.2) 1 (2.1)
Major self-injury or suicide attempt 27 (37.0) 12 (25.5)
Recent violence, n (%)
No physical aggression 64 (87.7) 40 (85.1) w2 = 1.4 (d.f. = 2) 0.51
Physical aggression without causing injury 4 (5.5) 5 (10.6)
Physical aggression causing injury 5 (6.9) 2 (4.3)
Symptoms,e mean (s.d) 1.8 (0.3) 2.3 (0.6) t=6.7 (d.f. = 118) 50.001
Relabelling of symptoms as pathological,f mean (s.d) 9.3 (2.5) 4.2 (3.2) t= –9.7 (d.f. = 115) 50.001
IQR, interquartile range.
a. Treatment refusal: 1 (complete rejection), 2 (partial rejection), 3 (reluctant acceptance), 4 (occasional reluctance), 5 (passive acceptance), 6 (moderate participation), 7 (active
participation).
b. Perceived coercion: 1 (no perceived coercion), 5 (maximum perceived coercion).
c. Negative pressure: 1 (no negative pressures), 5 (maximum negative pressures).
d. Voice: 1 (no voice) to 3 (full voice).
e. Symptoms: 1 (none).
f. Relabelling: 0 (no ability to relabel symptoms as pathological) to 12 (full ability to relabel symptoms).
Table 3 Differences between detained participants with and without capacity
Variable
Detained capacity
(n=12)
Detained incapacity
(n=68) Test statistic P
Treatment refusal,a mean (s.d.) 3.5 (1.9) 2.6 (1.4) t=72.0 (d.f. = 78) 0.05
Experience of admission, median (IQR)
Perceived coercionb 4.5 (2–5) 3.5 (2–5) Mann–Whitney z=70.6 0.54
Negative pressuresc 2 (1–5) 4 (1–5) Mann–Whitney z=1.3 0.19
Voiced 1 (1–2) 1.5 (0–2) Mann–Whitney z=0.37 0.71
Recent self-harm, n (%)
No self-harm 8 (66.7) 63 (92.7) Fisher’s exact 0.008
Minor self-injury 0 3 (4.4)
Major self-injury or suicide attempt 4 (33.3) 2 (2.9)
Recent violence, n (%)
No physical aggression 10 (83.3) 41 (60.3) Fisher’s exact 0.35
Physical aggression without causing injury 2 (16.7) 19 (27.9)
Physical aggression causing injury 0 8 (11.8)
Symptoms,e mean (s.d) 1.7 (0.4) 2.3 (0.7) t=3.0 (d.f. = 78) 0.004
Relabelling of symptoms as pathological,f mean (s.d) 7.9 (3.1) 2.5 (2.4) t= –7.0 (d.f. = 72) 50.001
IQR, interquartile range.
a. Treatment refusal: 1 (complete rejection), 2 (partial rejection), 3 (reluctant acceptance), 4 (occasional reluctance), 5 (passive acceptance), 6 (moderate participation), 7 (active
participation).
b. Perceived coercion: 1 (no perceived coercion), 5 (maximum perceived coercion).
c. Negative pressure: 1 (no negative pressures), 5 (maximum negative pressures).
d. Voice: 1 (no voice) to 3 (full voice).
e. Symptoms: 1 (none).
f. Relabelling: 0 (no ability to relabel symptoms as pathological) to 12 (full ability to relabel symptoms).
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safeguards under the amended Mental Capacity Act. Thus, in
relation to this significant group of individuals, clinicians will have
to become familiar with the identification of deprivations of
liberty and with the factors governing the choice of legislative
framework, including the person’s objections to treatment. In
relation to the presence of ‘objection’, the data indicate that
informal patients without capacity have higher levels of treatment
refusal, perceived coercion and negative treatment pressures on
admission and a reduced sense of ‘voice’ compared with informal
patients with capacity. The majority of people in this group have
levels of treatment refusal between occasional reluctance and
moderate participation. If any level of treatment adherence less
than ‘passive acceptance’ is taken as a marker for ‘objecting’ to
treatment then incapacity associates with ‘objection’ in informal
patients. Such a level of objection might amount to grounds for
preferring Mental Health Act detention to deprivation of liberty
under the Mental Capacity Act. This could lead to an increase
in the use of the Mental Health Act in relation to previously
informal patients who are deprived of their liberty. Much will
depend on how ‘deprivation of liberty’ and ‘objecting’ to
treatment are interpreted by clinicians and ultimately by the
courts – both will become significant legal concepts yet both pose
challenges of interpretation.
The capacity/detained group was small (6%). About a third
probably lacked capacity at the time of admission but had
recovered it by the time of interview. Most are on assessment
sections of the Mental Health Act. Surprisingly, participants in this
group did not feel more coerced than those without capacity who
are detained. They were less symptomatic and better able to relabel
their symptoms as pathological, an important aspect of insight.19
They self-harmed more but were neither more nor less violent. In
some cases, previous risky behaviour in someone whose further
intentions were not clear was a key factor. There have been human
rights concerns about detaining individuals with capacity.20,21 It
might be expected that this group would be characterised less by
psychotic illness, and more by people with personality disorders
posing considerable risk of harming themselves or others. In this
study over half of these individuals had psychotic illnesses as the
main diagnosis, and none had personality disorder as the main
diagnosis. However, the sample size for these analyses was small,
making it difficult to draw firm conclusions. Further, it is possible
that the existence of this group simply reflects a few inevitable
‘false negative’ errors in the capacity classification (or ‘false
positive’ errors in the application of the Mental Health Act).
Which factors are associated with detention on admission to
psychiatric hospital? We found that irrespective of capacity,
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Table 4 Associations of detention in participants with capacity
Variable
Capacity informal
(n=73)
Capacity detained
(n=12) Test statistic P
Treatment refusal,a mean (s.d.) 6.2 (0.8) 3.5 (1.9) t=8.3 (d.f. = 83) 50.001
Recent self-harm, n (%)
No self-harm 40 (54.8) 8 (66.7) Fisher’s exact 0.70
Minor self-injury 6 (8.2) 0
Major self-injury or suicide attempt 27 (37.0) 4 (33.3)
Recent violence, n (%)
No physical aggression 64 (87.7) 10 (83.3) Fisher’s exact 0.32
Physical aggression without causing injury 4 (5.5) 2 (16.7)
Physical aggression causing injury 5 (6.9) 0
Total symptoms,b mean (s.d) 1.8 (0.3) 1.7 (0.3) t=0.82 (d.f. = 83) 0.41
Relabelling of symptoms as pathological,c mean (s.d) 9.3 (2.5) 7.9 (3.1) t=1.7 (d.f. = 83) 0.09
a. Treatment refusal: 1 (complete rejection), 2 (partial rejection), 3 (reluctant acceptance), 4 (occasional reluctance), 5 (passive acceptance), 6 (moderate participation), 7 (active
participation).
b. Symptoms: 1 (none).
c. Relabelling: 0 (no ability to relabel symptoms as pathological) to 12 (full ability to relabel symptoms).
Table 5 Associations of detention in participants without capacity
Variable
Incapacity informal
(n=47)
Incapacity detained
(n=68) Test statistic P
Treatment refusal,a mean (s.d.) 4.7 (1.3) 2.6 (1.4) t=8.2 (d.f. = 113) 50.001
Recent self-harm, n (%)
No self-harm 34 (72.3) 63 (92.7) Fisher’s exact 0.001
Minor self-injury 1 (2.1) 3 (4.4)
Major self-injury or suicide attempt 12 (25.5) 2 (2.9)
Recent violence, n (%)
No physical aggression 40 (85.1) 41 (60.3) Fisher’s exact 0.02
Physical aggression without causing injury 5 (10.6) 19 (27.9)
Physical aggression causing injury 2 (4.3) 8 (11.8)
Total symptoms,b mean (s.d) 2.3 (0.6) 2.3 (0.7) t=0.09 (d.f. = 113) 0.93
Relabelling of symptoms as pathological,c mean (s.d) 4.2 (3.2) 2.5 (2.4) t=3.2 (d.f. = 104) 0.002
a. Treatment refusal: 1 (complete rejection), 2 (partial rejection), 3 (reluctant acceptance), 4 (occasional reluctance), 5 (passive acceptance), 6 (moderate participation), 7 (active
participation).
b. Symptoms: 1 (none).
c. Relabelling: 0 (no ability to relabel symptoms as pathological) to 12 (full ability to relabel symptoms).
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treatment refusal rather than recent violence or self-harm was
most strongly associated with detention. This suggests that it is
the perceived need for treatment by the clinical team in the face
of resistance from the individual that drives detention under the
Mental Health Act rather than recent self-harm or violence. The
only positive association of detention in participants with capacity
is treatment refusal. Relabelling of symptoms did not associate
with detention in this group. Although recent self-harm or
violence were not associated with detention for the group as a
whole, it was important for a subgroup of people where it was
difficult to assess the individual’s intentions in respect of a
repetition of self-harm or violence. The associations of detention
in people without capacity go beyond treatment refusal and
include recent violence and inability to relabel symptoms. This
suggests that in clinical practice the significance of recent violence
depends upon capacity status and the related concept of ability to
relabel symptoms as pathological. When capacity is absent, recent
violence seems more likely to trigger detention than when capacity
is present.
Methodological shortcomings
This is the largest study of mental capacity in a psychiatric setting
yet conducted, although as the study was carried out in an urban
setting in one jurisdiction it may not generalise to other
psychiatric in-patient settings. Previous studies were limited by
the use of convenience samples or not including an overall
judgement of capacity for a clinically significant decision.14 We
used a strictly consecutive sample and expanded treatment
decisions to include hospitalisation if this was the significant
treatment decision. Fifty-seven per cent of all admissions
participated in the assessment by the researcher. This raises the
issue of non-participation potentially creating a non-representative
sample. Our comparisons of non-participants and participants
on basic clinical and legal variables suggested that the participants
were reasonably representative of the individuals admitted.
Our assessments of capacity were not carried out at the precise
time of the clinical decision to admit the person to hospital. The
majority were carried out within 3 days. This time lag could be a
problem for missing rapidly fluctuating capacity status but we
believe that this is only likely to be a major factor in the setting
of emotional crises (e.g. surrounding self-harm), or drug or
alcohol intoxication. The majority of individuals who were
admitted had psychotic or serious affective illnesses that are
unlikely to involve significant capacity fluctuation over the course
of a few days.
Clinical and legal implications
Clinicians now face a more complex landscape of mental health
law. They will have to navigate two legal frameworks, the Mental
Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and keep in
mind the unfolding meaning of ‘deprivation of liberty’ and
‘objecting’ to treatment. This study maps existing psychiatric
practice onto this more complex legal landscape to show us some
of the implications. However, it was not able to resolve the
question of how prevalent ‘deprivation of liberty’ is in the
in-patient setting.
Although systematic study of the practice of mental health law
inevitably requires attention to specific jurisdictions (in this case
England and Wales) we think this study helps to illuminate
relationships between mental health law and guardianship/
incapacity law existing across many jurisdictions in the developed
world. How these dual legal frameworks will affect psychiatric
practice itself over time is yet to be seen.
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Appendix
Criteria for detention in hospital under the Mental
Health Act 1983 (as amended by the Mental Health
Act 2007)
A person can be detained for assessment under section 2 only if both the
following criteria apply:
(a) the person is suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree
which warrants their detention in hospital for assessment (or for
assessment followed by treatment) for at least a limited period; and
(b) the person ought to be so detained in the interests of their own health
or safety or with a view to the protection of others.
A person can be detained for treatment under section 3 only if all the
following criteria apply:
(a) the person is suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree
which makes it appropriate for them to receive medical treatment in
hospital;
(b) it is necessary for the health or safety of the person or for the protec-
tion of other persons that they should receive such treatment and it
cannot be provided unless the patient is detained under this
section; and
(c) appropriate medical treatment is available.
Department of Health. Code of Practice Mental Health Act 1983: 24. TSO
(The Stationery Office), 2008.
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Dracula (1897), Bram Stoker
Fiona Subotsky
Bram Stoker (1847–1912) came from an Irish medical family whose influence is not hard to detect in his most famous work, Dracula, which
sadly did not bring him the fame and fortune which his older brother William Thornley achieved. The latter was not only President of the Irish
College of Surgeons and knighted, but held appointments at the two major Dublin asylums – the Richmond Hospital and St Patrick’s. He was
even a member of the Medico–Psychological Society for a while, and thus was well-placed to advise on the activities and thought-processes of
the doctors in Dracula.
Dr John Seward, MD, is the well-to-do owner of one of the largest private asylums in London, where he resides, unaware until well into the
story that the vampire count has his sanctuary next door in the ancient mansion of Carfax, with its dusty chapel full of ‘earth-boxes’. Seward,
refused by the beautiful Lucy, takes an interest in the special patient Renfield, feeling proud at his novel diagnosis of ‘zoophagous maniac’. He
underestimates his patient’s dangerousness, however, and is severely assaulted, after which Renfield is put into a strait–waistcoat and
‘chained to the wall in a padded room’. Seward’s medical practice otherwise seems to comprise making his rounds and giving narcotics, such
as morphine and chloral, to himself, his friends and his patients. He dictates his notes into a phonograph, which supplies much contempora-
neous material for the narrative. When Lucy falls mysteriously ill, with a strange lassitude and pallor, Seward calls on his old teacher from
Amsterdam, Professor Van Helsing, who has not only medical but legal and philosophical qualifications. The approach of the two doctors
of the mind is contrasted: Seward is a materialist and an admirer of Ferrier. Van Helsing, who is interested in the work of Charcot and Lom-
broso, extends their ideas into the realm of the supernatural suggesting that hypnosis is but a short way from telepathy and that Dracula is a
kind of un-dead ‘throwback’ with an infantile and criminal mind. Despite their differences they become an effective team, their medical skills
being called on first to revive Lucy with blood transfusions, and then to bring Renfield round from a head injury with a craniotomy. Again, Van
Helsing takes things further, using the contents of his capacious medical bag for variously breaking and entering, and of course for ‘staking’
Lucy-as-Vampire and cutting off her head. However, as they chase Dracula across Europe, and into Transylvania, so the scientific and tech-
nical approach is less and less evident, and the power of ancient lore comes into its own.
Vampirism does seem in this novel to be some sort of disease. Medical commentators and others have interpreted the story as referring to
specific infections, consciously or unconsciously: the appearance of the thousands of rats has suggested the plague, ‘un-deadness’ and
Stoker’s mother’s tales of early experiences have suggested cholera, mentions of blood, pallor and sudden changes have suggested tuber-
culosis, the biting has suggested rabies, and last but not least the sexualised and bloody transmission and the possible cause of Stoker’s death
have suggested syphilis. Dr Van Helsing, in an up-to-date manner, recommends ‘sterilisation’ of the earth-boxes to prevent the spread.
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